Accountability in the Home and Community Care Sector in Ontario

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Defining our terms and sector

- Accountability defined

"the relationship that exists when one accepts responsibility that has been conferred and the duty to report back to the person or body that conferred it" (CHA, 2001, p3)

  - To whom, for what, and at what cost

- Home and community care sector
  - HCS: Home care services
  - CCS: Community care services

Home and Community Care in Ontario

- In Ontario
  - Wide variety of access points, eligibility requirements and methods of funding (Williams et al., 2009)
  - Community Care Access Centres (CCACs) provide and purchase HCS for clients through contracts
    - Moving to new outcome-based funding model
  - Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs) fund CCS through Multi-Service Accountability Agreements (MSAAs)
    - MSAA in it's second phase (2011-2014)

HCS and CSS agency accountability



Research questions: How do they respond?

- What is the array of realized organizational responses to accountability requirements?
- How do responses vary as a function of organizational factors?
- What are the potential impacts of accountability frameworks on home care service delivery?

Need for study

- Provide evidence to inform accountability reforms currently taking place.
- Better understanding of responsiveness could support improved policy which benefits both accountor and accountee
- Contributes to academic literature
  - Few studies examine accountability at the organizational level

Methods: Parallel-mixed methods

- **QUAN: Survey**
  - Sampling frame: HCS and CSS agencies from one urban and one rural region in Ontario & OCSA members
  - N = 115. Response rate: 18.82% (115 of 611)
  - Logistic regression models
- **QUAL: Document analysis and Semi-structured interviews**
  - **Document analysis**
    - LHIN MSAA and CCAC contract documents thematically coded (sub-set double coded).
  - **Semi-structured interviews**
    - Purposive, "criterion" sampling
    - 4 accountors from LHIN and CCAC in urban and rural regions
    - Accountees: HCS and CSS agencies in urban and rural regions
      - 14 organizations; 16 interviews with 20 individuals
    - Thematic coding conducted. Sub-set double coded for validation.
- **Parallel mixed-methods analysis** (Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie, 2003).

Organizational factors and responses

Organizational factors (Independent variables)

- Organizational size
- Financial and perceived dependence
- Access to resources
- Additional resources required
- # stakeholders
- Perceived stakeholder conflict
- Goal conflict
- Interaction
- Impact on autonomy
- Quality culture
- Demand factors (coerciveness, strictness, role clarity, professionalism)



Organizational responses (Dependent variables)

Compliance

Non-compliance

- Compromise and manipulation
- Avoidance
- Defiance

Based on Oliver's (1991). Organizational responsiveness framework

Findings: Organizational responses

Response	Type	Description
Compliance	Compliance (S & I)	Hold contract/agreements, plan to apply again, meeting reporting requirement, no sanctions, perceived compliance
	Internal modification (I)	Sub-contracting and partnering, adopting new policies/procedures, increase business-focus, changing HR roles and responsibilities.
Non-compliance	Compromise (S & I)	Negotiating contracts/agreements
	Avoidance (S & I)	Exit from the agreement (returned $)
	Defiance (I)	Experience sanctions (loss and/or reduction of contract) due to missed targets and/or reporting.

S = Data from survey. I = Data from interviews

Note: Non-compliance in the survey was operationalized as avoidance

Findings: Factors that influence responses

- Financial/perceived dependence
  - Increased dependence increased likelihood of compliance
- Size and access to resources
  - Not as strong a relationship
  - Effect moderated by dependence
- Autonomy and perceived strictness also had some influence over responsiveness, but dependence eclipsed their impact.

Financial dependence

Financial dependence	QUAN	QUAL
CCAC contract	Higher dependence significantly ($p<.0001$) increased likelihood of compliance	Organizations that had financial and perceived dependence on CCAC complied with demands.
MSAA	Dependence did not increase likelihood of compliance • 43.75% organizations receiving 81-100% funding from LHIN do not plan on applying in the future	As above

High administrative costs associated with MSAA could impact on other funding sources (Calabrese, 2011).

Size and access to resources

Access to resources	QUAN	QUAL
CCAC contract	No relationship between organizational size and access to resources and likelihood of compliance.	Additional resources (such as other financial opportunities) afforded large organizations more power to defy demands (CCAC) (Carlin and Finch, 2010).
MSAA	Weak relationship between organizational size and access to resources and likelihood of compliance.	Perceived requirement for additional resources to meet demands was more important that access to resources.

When dependence was high and access to resources low organizations engaged in ***internal modification –*** shifting HR time, partnerships, shifting organizational focus.

Unintended consequences

- **POSITIVE: Increased focus on quality**

"I think that the fact that we report on quality indicators quarterly and monthly to the CCAC is known from top to bottom in the organization. They see their team reports. They get competitive between the teams about who is going to perform better. So that whole awareness of quality constantly being monitored and watched and responded to and trying to get ahead of it, be proactive, all that awareness runs throughout the organization. If I was trying to engender that much focus on quality by myself as the director of quality, I think it would probably be a little bit harder." (HCS agency)

Unintended consequences

- **NEGATIVE: Time required to meet accountability demands (reporting, meetings) takes time away from clients**

"[I only have] *30 hours a week and every time we have a meeting I would be losing ten or twelve client hours… One week there would be sixty five e-mails in for me that included pages and pages of stuff to go through .*" (CCS agency)

- **NEGATIVE: Dis-incenting innovation** (Townley, 2005)

"The MSAA, they are so criteria-based, you hit the mark, or you didn't. They don't allow that developmental learning to go on… And they are very clear to me. If I don't hit my targets, it has implications on me receiving the funding again." (HCS & CSS agency)

Unintended consequences cont.

- Problems with indicators: "Tunnel vision" (Townley, 2005) and "veiled performance" (De Bruijn, 2007) and indicators competing with each other.

"We don't do a lot of outcome measurements. I don't think there are any actually related to client outcomes or achieving the client goals... Outcome, although difficult, goal achievement and outcome would be very important to ensure that we are using the CCAC dollars appropriately." (HCS agency)

"One thing that we are supposed to report which is [staff] *turnover rate, I find to be a real irritant to me. As far as I'm concerned the community support services sector always had lower wages. We are just not supported well here in this sector. So because of that we sometimes lose people to other positions and there's just such a discrepancy in what we can pay. So that contributes to the turnover rate which is outside the agency's ability to change."* (HCS agency)

Indicators compete with each other

"…sometimes we don't meet target because target competes with each other. For instance, sometimes we compromise continuity because we want to take a referral… A referral will come in, in the evening because the client has been discharged from hospital stay. We will send the evening nurse… or somebody that could go, anybody that could go, because we want to get the client in. But on and on-going basis that client might be on service, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, for example, pick up by another primary team but that does initial evening nurse won't be on…So by taking that initial referral… we disadvantaged ourselves because now that client is only going to get one trial visit."
(HCS agency)

Strengths and limitations

- Strengths
  - New perspective on accountability
    - Examines intersection between accountability frameworks and organizational behaviour
  - Mixed methods to allow for in-depth exploration
  - Includes accountor and accoutee perspectives
- Limitations
  - Generalizability – focus on two regions
  - For-profit organizations under-represented
  - Low survey response rate – however typical for organizational level surveys

Policy implications

- Re-consider standardized accountability frameworks
  - Overburden for small, dependent organizations
    - Provide more administrative funding and/or resources
  - Inadequate for large, well resourced less dependent organizations
    - Strengthen/modify sanctions (exp. Public reporting)
- Address the negative impact on client care time and innovation and the inadequacy of performance measures

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Thank you

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A note on response rates

- Typically we aim for response rates of over 60%-75% for surveys geared to individuals
- Surveys for organizations will experience much lower response rates (Baruch and Holtom, 2008)
  - Often **15%** is considered acceptable (Hager et al, 2003)

Baruch, Y. and Holtom, B.C. (2008) Survey response rate levels and trends in organizational research. *Human relations*, 61(8):1139-1160
Hager, M.A. et al (2003) Rates for Mail Survey of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review and Empirical Test. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,* 32: 252.

Dependence: QUAN data

Response to MSAA

Table 5-8. Logistic regression analysis of 53* organizations compliance response to LHIN MSAA in relation to the percent of funding received from LHINs.

Predictor	β	SEβ	Wald's χ^2	*df*	*p*	e^{β} & CI (odds ratio)
Intercept	-0.0294	0.5139	0.0033	1	0.9544	N/A
Percent LHIN funding	0.00556	0.00819	0.4600	1	0.4600	1.006 (0.990; 1.022)

Test	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Likelihood ratio test	0.4615	1	0.4965
Score test	0.624	1	0.4965
Wald test	0.4600	1	0.4976
Goodness-of-fit test			
Hosmer & Lemeshow**	10.6225	9	0.3025

Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL MSAACOMP (event = '1') = S_LHIN/LACKFIT;]
Somers' D*xy*: 0.104. Gamma: 0.107. Kendall's Tau-α: 0.052. *c*: 0.552.
All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision.
N/A = not applicable.

*This number is less than the total 56 organizations identified in Table 5-2 as some of these organizations had missing data on their size.
** More than 25% of the cells had an expected frequency of less than 5, which suggests that H-L may not be an appropriate test

Response to CCAC contract

Table 5-9. Logistic regression analysis of 47* organizations compliance response to CCAC contracts in relation to the percent funding received from CCACs.

Predictor	β	SEβ	Wald's χ^2	*df*	*p*	e^{β} & CI (odds ratio)
Intercept	-2.3901	0.5651	17.8883	1	<.0001	N/A
Percent CCAC funding	0.0349	0.0114	9.4549	1	0.0021	1.036 (1.013; 1.059)

Test	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Likelihood ratio test	11.0185	1	0.0009
Score test	14.4463	1	0.0001
Wald test	9.4549	1	0.0021
Goodness-of-fit test			
Hosmer & Lemeshow**	1.0731	1	0.3003

Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL CCACCOMP (event = '1') = S_CCAC/LACKFIT;]
Somers' D*xy*: 0.609. Gamma: 0.772. Kendall's Tau-α: 0.176. *c*: 0.804.
All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision.
N/A = not applicable.

*This number is less than the total 60 organizations identified in Table 5-2 as some of these organizations had missing data on their size.
** More than 25% of the cells had an expected frequency of less than 5, which suggests that H-L may not be an appropriate test.

- CCAC contact: Higher dependence increases likelihood of compliance
  - Each additional percent funding from CCAC makes organization 1.086 times more likely to comply
- MSAA: Higher dependence not found to increased likelihood of compliance
  - 43.75% organizations receiving 81-100% funding from LHIN do not plan on applying in the future

Dependence: QUAL data

- Compliant organizations reported organizational dependence (both CCAC and MSAA)
- QUAN findings for MSAA may be related to high administrative costs of compliance and the organization's access to resources (HR, time, IT, financial, accreditation)
  - Can impact other funding sources (Calabrese, 2011)

"Costs have sort of increased maybe with some of these additional accountability requirements in terms of being resource-intensive for the active monitoring of all the performance indicators and improvement initiatives." (CSA 4-1)

Access to resources: QUAN data

Response to MSAA

Table 5-13. Logistic regression analysis of 54* organizations compliance response to LHIN MSSAs in relation to the organizations size and human resource distribution.

Predictor	β	SEβ	Wald's χ^2	*df*	*p*	e^{β} & CI (odds ratio)
Intercept	-0.8801	0.9068	0.9420	1	0.3318	N/A
Size	0.4035	0.4348	0.8612	1	0.3534	1.497 (0.638; 3.510)
% Full-time staff	0.0295	0.0193	2.3344	1	0.1265	1.030 (0.992; 1.070)
Test			χ^2	*df*	*p*	
Likelihood ratio test			5.1581	2	0.0758	
Score test			4.5341	2	0.1036	
Wald test			3.9792	2	0.1367	
Goodness-of-fit test						
Hosmer & Lemeshow**			11.5817	9	0.2379	

Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL MSSACCOMP (event = '1') = SIZE FTEPERC VPERC/LACKFIT;]
Somers' D*xy*: 0.294. Gamma: 0.297. Kendall's Tau-α: 0.145. *c*: 0.647.
All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision.
N/A = not applicable.

*This number is less than the total 60 organizations identified in Table 5-2 as some of these organizations had missing data on their size.
** More than 25% of the cells had an expected frequency of less than 5, which suggests that H-L may not be an appropriate test.

Response to CCAC contract

Table 5-14. Logistic regression analysis of 47* organizations compliance response to CCAC contracts in relation to the organizations size, human resource distribution, and status.

Predictor	β	SEβ	Wald's χ^2	*df*	*p*	e^{β} & CI (odds ratio)
Intercept	-3.3669	1.5035	5.0147	1	0.0251	N/A
Size	0.8992	0.6271	2.0562	1	0.1516	2.458 (0.719; 8.400)
% Full-time staff	-0.0113	0.0190	0.3552	1	0.5512	0.989 (0.953; 1.026)
Status	1.7681	1.6654	1.1272	1	0.2884	5.860 (0.224; 153.265)
Test			χ^2	*df*	*p*	
Likelihood ratio test			3.3234	3	0.3444	
Score test			3.4311	3	0.3298	
Wald test			3.0689	3	0.3811	
Goodness-of-fit test						
Hosmer & Lemeshow**			6.6910	7	0.4618	

Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL CCACCCOMP (event = '1') = SIZE FTEPERC VPERC S_FPNFP/LACKFIT;]
Somers' D*xy*: 0.345. Gamma: 0.349. Kendall's Tau-α: 0.109. *c*: 0.673.
All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision.
N/A = not applicable.

*This number is less than the total 60 organizations identified in Table 5-2 as some of these organizations had missing data on their size.
** More than 25% of the cells had an expected frequency of less than 5, which suggests that H-L may not be an appropriate test.

- Weak relationship with regard to MSAA and no relationship with regard to CCAC

Access to resources: QUAL data

- Perceived requirement for additional resources to meet demands was more important that access to resources (MSAA)

"I would agree [that we need additional resources] *because some branches require additional human resources from an administrative perspective to ensure for example records management is meeting the required indicators."* (CSA 7)

- Additional resources (such as other financial opportunities) afforded large organizations more power to circumvent demands (CCAC) (Carlin and Finch, 2010).
  - Related to lower dependence for funding – increased organizational power.
  - Rather than inability to meet requirements, it may be an unwillingness to meet demands